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A PACK OF WILD DOGS?
CHEW V. GATES AND POLICE CANINE
EXCESSIVE FORCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution re-
quires "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ...
against unreasonable... seizures."' The scope and interpretation of
this Amendment has been debated in volumes of legal opinions, yet
it is beyond argument that the Constitution applies to all citizens and
every individual has the right to have any violation of it reviewed by
a court of law.2 Nevertheless, decisions involving police canine ex-
cessive force have robbed individuals of this fundamental opportu-
nity3 and perpetuate a constitutional wrong without any chance for
review.
4
Police canines are not at the front of people's minds as an ex-
treme constitutional danger. This unexpected source has mush-
roomed in the Ninth Circuit, specifically Southern California, and
has spread throughout the federal system.5  Police dog excessive
force claims are similar in theory to other types of indirect police
force, 6 but police dog force is unique in several important respects.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(stating that the rights of the individual are paramount).
3. "For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process
has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be
heard."' Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale,
68 U.S. 223, 234 (1863)).
4. The recognition of the constitutional injury is taken up in Part II and
Part III, infra.
5. See David G. Savage, Necessary Weapons, or E-xcessive Force? A First
of Two Parts, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1996, at Al ("Southern California leads the
nation in police dog-bite lawsuits .... ).
6. Indirect police force is force not directly caused by the officer himself.
For example, shootings or pepper spray qualify as indirect force whereas a ba-
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First, police canines are used primarily to detect as well as seize sus-
pects. Second, canine force is frequently applied while the dog is out
of sight of the deploying officer. Third, the canine, not the officer,
determines and applies the amount of force.
Generally, police dog force arises under a typical scenario. A
police dog handler (or "K-9 unit") is called by other officers to ferret
out a hidden suspect in a building or junkyard. The handler and
other officers warn the suspect to surrender or a trained police dog
will be released and the suspect may be bit. If the cloaked person
does not comply, the handler deploys the dog which uses its keen
sense of smell to find the person. The dog then bites the suspect and
holds him or her until .the handler arrives and orders the animal off.
The suspect is then taken into custody.
The typical police dog lawsuit occurs when the detainee is not
resisting arrest, not dangerous, not violent, or not the intended sus-
pect, but is bitten anyway. In that context, the dog bite constitutes
excessive force and violates the Fourth Amendment guarantee of
reasonableness.7 However, it is this author's contention that police
dogs are per se unreasonable and, therefore, a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Yet, judicial illogic and bias protects police dogs from
a fair review.
The judicial protection of police dogs typically begins when the
injured detainee brings a lawsuit against the individual police officer
and the municipality employing the police officer. Municipal em-
ployees enjoy a degree of qualified immunity, yet they can still be
held liable under certain circumstances. 8 The municipality itself
cannot be held liable under any vicarious liability or respondeat su-
perior theory, but may be held liable for any constitutional violations
the city itself caused via its official practices and policies.
9
The Ninth Circuit addressed the general issue of municipal li-
ability in the police canine context in the aptly named Chew v.
ton does not.
7. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Tennesee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1 (1985); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The standard of review and
reasonableness in excessive force cases is taken up in Part II.A, infra.
8. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664 (1978). The li-
ability of a city and its employees is discussed in Part II.B, infra.
9. See id. at 690.
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Gates.' 0 The court agreed with the general rule handed down by the
U.S. Supreme Court that a city could be held liable for its police dog
policy if a constitutional injury was found.
However, in Chew, the leading police dog bite case, the court set
a high threshold for finding a constitutional injury. Trial courts must
bifurcate the issue of individual police officer liability from the
broader issue of municipal liability. Therefore, unless a verdict has
been rendered against the individual defendant police officer, the
courts will presume that no injury occurred.12 This results in two de-
nials to the victims of police dogs. First, they cannot sue the munici-
pality independently from the individual officer, despite the munici-
pality standing as a separate defendant.' 3  Second, on the rare
occasion when a constitutional injury is found, the victim is fully
compensated for his or her harm and the city is only exposed to li-
ability for nominal damages. 14 These two denials have resulted in
insulation from facial attacks on the police dog policy itself. This
stance is contrary to U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit hold-
ings.
15
As devastating as the bifurcation procedure has been to litigating
police dog use, it is not the only tactic employed by the courts to
protect police dogs. By using an incomplete definition of deadly
force, courts have labeled police dogs as nondeadly and denied the
more rigorous standard of review that deadly force requires and vic-
tims of police dogs deserve.' 6 Further, courts rely on unsubstantiated
policy arguments to protect police dogs from any honest or critical
review. 17 This shortsighted law and order attitude not only harms
10. 27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994).
11. See Watkins v. City of Oakland, Cal., 145 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1998);
Fikes v. Cleghom, 47 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1995).
12. See Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1091; Fikes, 47 F.3d at 1015; Chew, 27 F.3d at
1436.
13. See Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1092; Fikes, 47 F.3d at 1014; Chew, 27 F.3d at
1437.
14. See Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1092; Fikes, 47 F.3d at 1014; Chew, 27 F.3d at
1437.
15. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 662-66 (1978); Chew,
27 F.3d at 1437.
16. See Vera Cruz v. City of Escondido, 139 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 1997) (en
bane); Robinette v. Barnes, 854 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1988).
17. See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1462 (Trott, J., concurring and dissenting).
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innocents, but is unnecessary since police dogs can be trained to
make them safer and more efficient.
Unfortunately, the tainted review currently used means rampant
unconstitutional police dog use. This Article addresses these prob-
lems and explores some solutions. Section II addresses the existing
law involved in this issue, particularly Fourth Amendment excessive
force precedent, municipal liability precedent and 42 U.S.C. §
1983,18 and Chew-the case that embodies the frequent errors made
in this area. Section III critiques the faults of police dog jurispru-
dence. Section IV suggests recommendations to solve the current
state of affairs.
II. EXISTING LAW
Chew v. Gates,19 as indicated above, is the leading police dog
bite case and an excellent example of the problematic situation that
has developed with police dog actions. In order to understand the is-
sues and problems in Chew, it is important to appreciate the law sur-
rounding the decision itself. The legal backdrop for Chew can be
separated into two distinct parts: (1) excessive force and (2) munici-
pal liability.
A. Excessive Force Doctrine
The first step for all police force related claims is to determine
which constitutional right is at issue. In the current state of the law,
the obvious answer seems to be the Fourth Amendment and its pro-
hibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures.
' 2°
However, this was not always the case. At one time, police
force cases were construed to be among the general bundle of rights
associated with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.21 Judge Friendly, basing his interpretation on Rochin v. Cali-
fornia,2 held that "quite apart from any 'specific' of the Bill of
Rights, application of undue force by law enforcement officers
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
19. 27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .....
22. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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deprives a suspect of liberty without due process of law."23 He set
forth four factors to determine "whether the constitutional line has
been crossed."24 The factors were:
(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship
between that need and the amount of force that was used;
(3) the extent of the injury inflicted; and (4) "[w]hether the
force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and re-
store discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm."
25
The Supreme Court rejected this test and the "notion that all exces-
sive force claims ... are governed by a single generic standard.
' 26
The Court also took issue with Friendly's test in that it examined
neither the "Fourth Amendment nor the Eighth [Amendment], the
two most textually obvious sources of constitutional protection
against physically abusive governmental conduct.,
27
23. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1033 (1973). This denial of certiorari lead to "the vast majority of lower
federal courts ... [applying the] ... 'substantive due process' test indiscrimi-
nately to all excessive force claims lodged against law enforcement... under §
1983 . .. ." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989).
24. Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033.
25. Graham, 490 U.S. at 390 (quoting Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F.
Supp. 246, 248 (W.D.N.C. 1986)) (emphasis added). Note that the last factor
requires a "good faith effort" and is a subjective component of the test. This is
a subtle way of creating a significant threshold for excessive force claims.
Short of a "malicious or sadistic" intent, the police officer applying the force
would not violate any provisions of the Constitution. Note the incongruity
with an example-a police officer uses a choke hold on a drunken, noncom-
plying suspect. The officer's intent is clearly to "maintain and restore disci-
pline." The good intent would prevent the finding of a constitutional injury
and immunize the officer from any excessive force claim. This would be true
no matter how long the choke hold was applied.
Granted, the three other factors are pure objective tests, but it is impor-
tant to remember that this test is weighed by the jury, not the judge. Any good
faith prong will allow the lay person to defer to the police officers "just doing
my job" mentality. In a system that is already stacked against victims of ex-
cessive police force, this subjective test would raise the bar even higher.
26. Id. at 393.
27. Id. at 392. In Judge Friendiy's defense, using substantive due process
was not a ridiculous notion. The Court had only recently incorporated the
Fourth Amendment coverage into the Fourteenth Amendment. See Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-34 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961). The leading standards of review for Fourth Amendment violations
January 2001]
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If a police officer denies a erson's freedom to move, the police
officer has seized that person. Police canines are trained and em-
ployed to find and capture hidden suspects. This clearly brings po-
lice canine force within the auspices of the Fourth Amendment's
language forbidding "unreasonable searches and seizures.' 2 9 How-
ever, debate lingers over whether police dogs are deadly force or
not.30 This question is relevant since different standards apply for
deadly force and general force.
1. Deadly force
Modem deadly force law frequently has its own special set of
rules and restrictions compared to other forms of force used by po-
lice officers. 31  However, when the Framers drafted the Fourth
Amendment, the common law did not make a distinction between
deadly and nondeadly force;32 therefore, it is possible that if the
were set in Tennesee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), twelve years after Judge
Friendly set his four factor test. The standard of review set forth in Garner
would be further refined in Graham.
28. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30. The topic of dogs as objects of deadly force will be discussed more
closely in Parts II.C.1, III.B, III.C.2, and IV.B, infra.
31. The Model Penal Code is a fine example of the extra limitations on
deadly force. "The [general] use of force is not justifiable under this Section
unless: the actor makes known the purpose of the arrest or believes that it is
otherwise known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be
arrested.... ." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(a)(i) (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985). Interpreting this section in an antipolice force stance would
merely require the police to give the arrestee an opportunity to surrender.
Compare this to the deadly force provision:
The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless: the
arrest is for a felony; and the person effecting the arrest is authorized
to act as a peace officer.... the actor believes that the force employed
creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and the actor
believes that: the crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct
including the use or threatened use of deadly force; or there is a sub-
stantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious
bodily injury if his apprehension is delayed.
Id. § 3.07(2)(b)(i)-(iv) (emphasis added). Note that all four of these prongs
must be satisfied for a police officer to be justified in using deadly force. A
dramatic difference.
32. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 12-13. The common law "allowed the use of
whatever force was necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon"; therefore,
[34:937
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Framers considered the use of deadly force reasonable to arrest re-
sisting or fleeing felons, then the Court should also accept deadly
force as reasonable per se. The Supreme Court rejected this notion
recognizing that it arose at a time "when virtually all felonies were
punishable by death.,3 3 The Court noted that with modem criminal
codes, the difference between felonies and minor infractions were in-
significant and arbitrary. 4 Furthermore, in light of modem firearms
and improved apprehension techniques, it is no longer acceptable nor
necessary to shoot fleeing felons. "The use of deadly force to pre-
vent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is
constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony suspects
die than that they escape."
35
The Court set forth ground rules with which to analyze deadly
force use. "To determine the constitutionality of a seizure '[a court]
must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the gov-
ernmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."' 36 This interest
balancing is of vital importance to the Fourth Amendment,3 7 and it is
clear that the reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment is con-
cemed with how the seizure is conducted.38
The Court then went on to balance the individual's Fourth
Amendment rights with the state's interests in making seizures with
deadly force.39 "The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly
force is unmatched. The suspect's fundamental interest in his own
life need not be elaborated upon."40 In contrast to this powerful in-
dividual interest, the state's interest in the use of deadly force was
the differences between general and deadly force were nonfactors. Id. at 12.
33. Id. at 13. "'[flf persons that are pursued by these officers for felony or
the just suspicion thereof... shall not yield themselves to these officers, but
shall either resist or fly... so that they cannot be otherwise apprehended, and
are upon necessity slain therein ... it is no felony [for the officers].'" Id. at 12
(quoting 2 M. HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE 85 (1736)).
34. See id. at 14.
35. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
37. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,700 n.12 (1981).
38. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968).
39. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 9-12.
40. Id. at 9.
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not nearly as broad or as compelling as the state claimed. 41 The state
interest in reducing crime by discouraging suspects from fleeing was
an important goal, but did not "justify the killing of nonviolent sus-
pects."
42
The Court pointed to two reasons why the state's interest was
lacking.43 First, if police officers were successful in seizing a sus-
pect with deadly force, the criminal justice system would not be
used. 4 Second, many law enforcement agencies across the country
were banning the practice of seizing nonviolent suspects with deadly
force.45 These two interests were why the Court was "not persuaded
... that [using deadly force on] nondangerous fleeing suspects is so
vital as to outweigh the suspect's interest in his own life .... [T]he
fact that the police arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot does
not always justify killing the suspect."
46
The Court then outlined when deadly force would be appropri-
ate: "Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect
poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to oth-
ers."4 7 Deadly force would be justified if the suspect brandished a
weapon, caused serious bodily harm, or was thought to have caused
serious bodily harm. 48 Furthermore, deadly force required a warning
when at all practical. 49 As a result, deadly force is more likely to be
held unreasonable in a Fourth Amendment analysis.
2. General use of force
"Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that
the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries
with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat
thereof to effect it."50 In analyzing general use of force claims, the
41. See id. at 10.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 10-11.
44. See id. at 10 (explaining that a dead suspect is not better than a suspect
within the "criminal justice mechanism").
45. Seeid. at 10-11.
46. Id. at 11.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 11-12.
50. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-27).
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Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard is applied.51 The Court
expanded on the interest balancing test laid out in Garner and gave a
more generalized outline of how to handle force claims of all kinds
in Graham.
5 2
Since "[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment
is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,"53 the
precise details and happenings of the seizure take on great impor-
tance and demand careful scrutiny.54 In fact, specific parts of the
seizure's circumstances must be analyzed, "including the severity of
the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to
the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resist-
ing arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.' 55 The Court reem-
phasized a statement made in Garner, "the question was whether the
totality of the circumstances justified a particular sort of. . .sei-
zure."
56
Graham went a step further to point out that when judging an
excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, "[t]he 'reason-
ableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the per-
spective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindsight."57  This perspective of judging reason-
ableness protects police officers' use of force even when they are in-
correct in seizing a suspect. 58 The Court deemed reasonableness
51. See id. at 395. The Graham Court explained:
Today we make explicit what was implicit in Garner's analysis, and
hold that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive
force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or
other "seizure" of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment and its "reasonableness" standard .. . . Because the
Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitu-
tional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental
conduct.
52. See id. at 396.
53. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
54. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
55. Id.
56. Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9. This "totality of the circumstances test" came
on the heels of a laundry list of cases applying the same test to other Fourth
Amendment issues. See id.
57. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22).
58. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87-89 (1987); Hill v. California,
401 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1971).
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judged from the police officer's point of view as necessary because
of their need "to make split-second judgments-in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of
force that is necessary in a particular situation.,
59
The Court also stressed objectivity as paramount in determining
if the force used was reasonable. 60 "Not every push or shove, even if
it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers" is
automatically unreasonable. 61 No matter how good or bad the police
officer's intent, if the force appears to be objectively reasonable, it
will pass constitutional muster.62 Therefore, nondeadly excessive
force cases must be examined by an on the scene objective reason-
ableness test that takes into account the totality of the circumstances.
B. Municipal Liability Doctrine
Historically, for a government to be held liable for its torts was
simply unthinkable. English common law held that the King was
above all wrong and to sue him in tort would be to question his di-
vine right.63 This belief was incorporated into American common
law and resulted in the same absolute immunity for state govern-
ment.64 This absolute immunity had a trickle down effect to state
agencies and chartered local municipalities that took their authority
from state rule.
65
59. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
60. See id.
61. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
62. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. This purely objective test may have as
many flaws as the subjective test discussed supra at note 25. Detractors would
argue that this insulates police officers who use force with the evil intention of
harming suspects, simply because the force appears reasonable. True, wrong-
ful intent should be combated. Yet, if the force is judged to be reasonable,
then the evil intent lacks an evil result, and the harm the police officer has
caused is not as dangerous. Furthermore, short of mind reading, subjective
wrongful intent is nearly impossible to prove in the context of a reasonable sei-
zure. Perhaps police officer training is the better method to battle wrongful
intent than judicial review. The public should be satisfied with stopping evil
results compared to the vague and hard to prove evil intentions.
63. See DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION
387 (3d ed. 1997).
64. See id.
65. See id.
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Unlike the state government, municipalities did not have com-
plete immunity histroically. Municipalities could be held in tort for
nuisance, improper maintenance of streets, and other nongovern-
mental or proprietary functions.6 6 Despite this small difference, mu-
nicipalities enjoyed substantial immunity in regards to their principal
governmental functions. Understandably, states and local govern-
ments were slow to eliminate this favored status.67 Nevertheless,
once state and municipal liability was imposed, significant restric-
tions were left in place. For example, almost every state and local
government retained a discretionary function immunity for govern-
mental decisions. 68 As a result, plaintiffs who wanted to win com-
plete verdicts, or, for the right to bring a suit at all, had to seek pro-
tection in the federal courts.
The route to federal courts was usually via section 1983 ac-
tions.69 While section 1983 allows federal redress for violations of
66. See id. at 387-88. For example, a local government's control over a
garbage dump or other utility that resulted in wrongful conduct would create
governmental liability as any other market participant. The government's par-
ticipation in functions that could also be accomplished by private individuals
was generally outside traditional municipal immunity.
67. The first state to eliminate its special immunity was New York, which
waived the privilege in 1929. See id. at 388. For better or worse, this was in-
terpreted to include all municipalities as well. See 1d. (citing Bemardine v.
City of New York, 62 N.E.2d 604 (N.Y. 1945)). Other states were reluctant to
follow New York's lead. In 1954, no other state had abolished sovereign im-
munity. See DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 63, at 388. It was not until the
1960s and 1970s that state legislatures and courts began to change this policy.
See id.
68. See DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 63, at 388. For example, a discre-
tionary government policy of having all police cars fixed by government em-
ployees could not be challenged. However, if the repairs were done negli-
gently, the government would be exposed to a tort suit.
This example seems innocuous, but the notion of discretion is not lim-
ited to broad government decisions and can be amazingly expansive. In par-
ticular, police officials were acting within their discretion when they released a
known pedophile, who threatened to murder a child, from custody. See
Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741,758, 614 P.2d 728, 738, 167
Cal. Rptr. 70, 80 (1980) (stating that after the child molester fulfilled his
promise and murdered a five-year-old boy, the police department was held
immune from suit because the decision to release was discretionary). Clearly,
police discretion remains immune.
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1999). The statute directs:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
January 2001]
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constitutional rights under the "color of law," the constitutional in-
jury must be done by a "person." 70 The Supreme Court did not con-
sider municipalities to be persons for the purposes of applying sec-
tion 1983.71 "The sole basis for this conclusion was an inference
drawn from Congress' rejection of the 'Sherman amendment' 72 to
the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the precursor of
§ 1983." 73 The Sherman amendment dealt with protecting slaves
from Klu Klux Klan riots and lynchings by holding the municipality
where the riot took place accountable. In particular, the Court ex-
plained:
Although the Sherman amendment did not seek to amend
§ 1 of the Act, which is now § 1983, and although the na-
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
70. Id.
71. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) ("Congress did not un-
dertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of [§ 1983].").
72. See id. at 188. The Sherman amendment stated:
That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, barn, or granary
shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned,
or destroyed, wholly or in part, by any persons riotously and tumultu-
ously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with
force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or killed by any
persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; and if such of-
fense was committed to deprive any person of any right conferred
upon him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to deter
him or punish him for exercising such right, or by reason of his race,
color, or previous condition of servitude, in every such case the in-
habitants of the county, city, or parish in which any of the said of-
fenses shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to
the person or persons damnified by such offense if living, or to his
widow or legal representative if dead; and such compensation may be
recovered by such person or his representative by a suit in any court
of the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district in which
the offense was committed, to be in the name of the person injured, or
his legal representative, and against said county, city, or parish.
Id. at 188 n.38 (emphasis added).
73. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664 (1978) (citation
omitted).
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ture of the obligation created by that amendment was vastly
different from that created by § 1, the Court nonetheless
concluded... that Congress must have meant to exclude
municipal corporations from the coverage of § 1 because
"the House [in voting against the Sherman amendment] had
solemnly decided that in their judgment Congress had no
constitutional power to impose any obligation upon county
and town organizations, the mere instrumentality for the
administration of state law." This statement, we thought,
showed that Congress doubted its "constitutional power...
to impose civil liability on municipalities," and that such
doubt would have extended to any type of civil liability.
74
Once the Sherman amendment was removed, both Houses of Con-
gress quickly passed the provisions. 75 With this, it appeared that
Congress did not expressly intend that municipalities should be liable
under section 1983.76
However, the Court corrected this mistaken notion with a more
careful examination of the legislative history surrounding the
Sherman amendment.77 There was a great deal of ambiguity in the
use of the word "obligation." Did it mean "liability," in the civil tort
sense, or "mandated," in a federal proclamation sense?78 Were the
municipalities "obliged" to pay for their wrongs or were they
"obliged" to obey federal orders? The Court determined that the op-
ponents to the Sherman amendment had the latter definition in mind
when they sought its removal.79  The exclusion of the Sherman
74. Id. (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190) (emphasis removed).
75. See id. at 668-69.
76. See id. at 669.
77. See id. at 670-91.
78. See id.
79. See id. This realization came about by examining the debate over the
Sherman amendment. In explaining the Sherman amendment, the closest
analog was ironically a runaway slave statute. When slaves fled to the North,
there was a chance that slave owners would be denied their property rights-
the slaves-by states that were hostile to slavery. See id. at 672 (discussing
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 612 (1842)). To protect these in-
dividual property rights guaranteed by the Constitution, Congress passed a
statute that would impose a remedy against the municipality that denied a slave
owner's property. See id. This simply was a Contract Clause rationale.
The Court next examined those opposing the Sherman amendment and
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amendment from the Civil Rights Act (and by extension, section
1983) was not done with the intention to exclude municipalities and,
therefore, municipalities were "persons" under section 1983.80
This finding hardly left municipalities wide open to civil liabil-
ity.
[T]he same legislative history compels the conclusion that
Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable un-
less action pursuant to official municipal policy of some
nature caused a constitutional tort. In particular,... a mu-
nicipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be
held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.
81
The Court held that a municipality was immune to section 1983
actions when government employees inflicted injuries purely of their
their reasoning. The opposition's rationale had little to do with municipal li-
ability in the sense explained above, but instead dealt with obligating police
force behavior and other federalism concerns. See id. at 672-79. In fact, the
Court noted:
[W]e think it clear, that the Federal Government, under the Constitu-
tion, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty
whatever, and compel him to perform it; for if it possessed this power,
it might overload the officer with duties which would fill up all his
time, and disable him from performing his obligations to the State
Id. at 678 (citations omitted).
Furthermore, "by 1871, it was well understood that corporations should
be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and
statutory analysis." Id. at 687.
80. See id. at 690-91.
81. Id. at 691. The legislative history behind this finding again involved the
debate around the Sherman amendment, with supporters proclaiming that "the
amendment came into play only when a locality was at fault or had knowingly
neglected its duty to provide protection." Id. at 692 n.57. Nevertheless, this
sentiment did not foreclose all vicarious liability potential in the Sherman
amendment. There was liability without fault in that the Sherman amendment
still punished a municipality that was powerless to prevent a riot. See id. The
Court was not dissuaded by this interpretation and believed "the inference that
Congress did not intend to impose such liability is quite strong." Id. This cer-
tainty may have come from Congress's considering and rejecting the tradi-
tional justifications for respondeat superior, spreading the costs of harm to the
community as a whole and considering injuries as a cost of doing business.
See id. at 692-94.
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own volition.8 2 "Instead, it is when execution of a government's
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts
the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under §
1983. , '83
Therefore, if government employees execute official policy or
custom and harm another person, he or she will be open to a section
1983 claim. Further, if a supervisor who implements policy for the
municipal corporation is personally involved or has established a
"custom" of behavior for his or her employees, this too will allow a
section 1983 claim.8 4 "Congress included customs and usages [in
§ 1983] because of the persistent and widespread discriminatory
practices of state officials.... Although not authorized by written
law, such practices of state officials could well be so permanent and
well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of
law."
8 5
A municipality can be liable for formal and informal policies and
customs that harm individuals through their ratified execution by a
municipal actor.
C. Analysis of Chew v. Gates
8 6
The three distinct opinions rendered in Chew must now be ex-
amined in light of the above background information. The facts in
Chew are typical of police canine force cases. Thane Carl Chew was
stopped for a traffic violation and, after an innocuous exchange, the
detaining officer executed a routine background check. The officer
82. See id. at 689-94.
83. Id. at 694.
84. See id. at 690-91. Acording to the Monell Court:
[A]lthough the touchstone of the § 1983 action against a government
body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a depriva-
tion of rights protected by the Constitution, local governments, like
every other § 1983 "person," by the very terms of the statute, may be
sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental
"custom" even though such a custom has not received formal approval
through the body's official decision making channels.
85. Id. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68
(1970)).
86. 27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994).
87. See id. at 1436.
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discovered three outstanding felony warrants for Chew and, before
he was able to take Chew into custody or frisk him for weapons, the
suspect fled.88 The officer pursued Chew to a scrapyard, and due to
its size and dangerous nature, called for backup officers. 89 The po-
lice quickly set up a perimeter and deployed a helicopter and police
canine units to search for the fugitive.
90
"Officer Bunch and his charge, police dog Volker, were among
those dispatched to assist in the search of the scrapyard. Officer
Bunch unleashed Volker and, approximately two hours after Chew
had fled to the yard, Volker found him crouching between two metal
bins."91
Unfortunately, and all too common, the officer's and the sus-
pect's versions of the facts diverge because Volker was well out of
sight of his master, Officer Bunch.92 Chew contended that once he
saw Volker he immediately tried to surrender and offered no resis-
tance.93  Nevertheless, "Volker bit Chew several times and then
seized him, [whereby] Chew sustained severe lacerations to his left
side and left forearm." 94 Officer Bunch bitterly denied this version
and described Chew as actively resisting arrest by "hitting the dog
with a pipe. '95 In light of this resistance, Officer Bunch "acknow-
lege[d] that he may have kicked Chew in the head, face, or body"
while Volker continued to seize Chew by biting him.
96
After the incident, Chew sued the City of Los Angeles and the
chief of police, Darryl Gates, as an individual and in his official ca-
pacity. 97 The district court dismissed all of the claims, except for
the one against Officer Bunch, on qualified immunity grounds and
the fact that the plaintiff was unable to prove that a City of Los
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. In addition to Officer Bunch, Chew also sued "Sergeants Don-
ald Yarnall and Mark Mooring (who trained the L.A.P.D. canines), and Cap-
tain Patrick McKinley (who had overall supervisory responsibility for the K-9
unit) as defendants in their individual capacities." Id.
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Angeles policy or custom was responsible for his harm.98 At trial,
the jury awarded "a $13,000 general verdict in Chew's favor," but
the city paid the judgment and all court costs.
99
Two fundamental questions were raised on appeal. First,
"whether the Los Angeles Police Department's policy governing the
use of dogs to seize fleeing or hiding suspects [was] unconstitu-
tional" and second, if "the officers who are responsible for promul-
gating that policy enjoy[ed] qualified immunity."'0 The court an-
swered these two questions with the three appellate judges
employing three distinct rationales. The court answered the first
question by concluding "that the district court erred in holding the
police department's policy governing the use of dogs constitu-
tional."''1 1 However, those officers who implemented the policy
were immune because "the law with respect to the use of police dogs
to seize and bite concealed suspects was not sufficiently established
that a reasonable officer would have known that the Los Angeles
Police Department's policy was unconstitutional."'
10 2
In reaching this conclusion, each judge applied a different ra-
tionale. It is important to examine each judge's opinion to appreciate
the ramifications and flaws in the law that have developed. In turn,
Judge Reinhardt's broad excessive force approach, Judge Norris's
deadly force approach, and Judge Trott's policy approach will be ad-
dressed.
1. Judge Reinhardt's excessive force approach
Chew claimed that his constitutional rights were violated by Of-
ficer Bunch in three ways: deploying Volker to search the scrap
yard, ordering Volker to attack as Chew tried to surrender, and
98. See id.
99. Id. The defendants contended that the claim against the city was im-
proper because the plaintiff was fully compensated for his injuries at trial. See
id. at 1436-37. However, the jury did not specify which wrongful act they
were compensating Chew for, the dog bites or Bunch's punches and kicks. See
id. at 1437-38. Since the jury award could have been exclusively for the offi-
cer's individual wrongful behavior, the city would still be liable for the injuries
caused by Volker and the city's police dog training policy. See id.
100. Id. at 1435.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1436.
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stomping Chew while he was down. 103 Chew also alleged that the
city "violated his rights by adopting and implementing a policy of
training and using police dogs in an unreasonable manner."' 10 4 "The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining
defendants on the ground that the use of Volker for the purpose of
apprehending Chew was an objectively reasonable act."
105
To reverse on appeal, Chew had to prove "that his seizure by
Volker was unconstitutional" and that "the city was responsible for
that constitutional wrong." 10 6 Chew set forth two distinct theories of
municipal liability: First, "Bunch's [unreasonable] action was
caused by a city policy, custom, or usage" and resulted in Chew's
exposure to excessive force. 10 7 Second, "regardless of the reason-
ableness of Officer Bunch's action in releasing the dog... the city's
policy of training police dogs such as Volker to apprehend unarmed
and non-resistant suspects by biting, mauling, and seizing them was
itself unreasonable and unconstitutional."'10 8 Simply put, the first
claim "depend[ed] upon an assessment of the objective facts and cir-
cumstances bearing on the reasonableness of Officer Bunch's deci-
sion to release Volker." 10 9 The second claim "tum[ed], on the rea-
sonableness of the city's general policy of training dogs to bite and
seize all suspects."
110
In addressing the first claim, Judge Reinhardt noted that there
was "little doubt that a trier of fact could find that Chew's injury was
caused by city policy." '111 The city policy was to use police dogs to
restrain all types of concealed suspects, regardless of the danger they
presented, and Officer Bunch clearly acted pursuant to that policy.
112
Therefore, if Officer Bunch acted unreasonably and caused a consti-
tutional harm in executing the city's policy, the city should be liable.
103. See id. at 1437.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1439.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1440.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1444.
112. See id. at 1445.
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Judge Reinhardt used the three part test in Graham v. Connor"1
3
to determine the reasonableness of Officer Bunch's decision to re-
lease Volker:1 4 (1) the threat the suspect posed to the officers or
others, (2) the severity of the suspect's crime, and (3) whether the
suspect was resisting or evading arrest.1
1 5
Judge Reinhardt held that Chew did not satisfy the most impor-
tant Graham factor-he did not pose a threat to others or to the offi-
cers.116 Judge Reinhardt took note that the officer originally stopped
Chew for a traffic violation, where they engaged in conversation, and
the officer did not feel the need to search him for the officer's own
safety. 1 7 Chew did flee from the police, but he never physically re-
sisted arrest and the dog handler had no reason to believe Chew
would be physically violent when he released his dog. "' Finally, the
severity of the crime was unclear, since Chew was wanted for a gen-
eralized felony and not a specific one." 9 The wide variety of felo-
nies that exist cover both violent and nonviolent crimes, therefore,
being wanted for a felony was not de facto "severe."' 120 Conse-
quently, Officer Bunch could have violated Chew's constitutional
rights in releasing Volker. 12  By extension, the city would also be
liable for the harm.
122
In order to find the city liable under the second claim, the police
dog policy had to be unconstitutional on its face.123 In other words,
there would be no reasonable way to enforce the policy. Judge
Reinhardt did not believe it necessary to "determine the constitution-
ality of the Department's policy"'124 on appeal, but encouraged Chew
to fully explore the matter on remand.125 It is likely, considering the
113. 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). The three part test was discussed in Part
II.A, supra.
114. See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1440.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 1441-42.
117. See id. at 1442.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 1442-43.
120. See id. at 1442.
121. See id. at 1443.
122. See id. at 1444.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 1444 n.12.
125. See id. at 1444-46.
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focus of Judge Reinhardt's opinion on the first claim, that he would
consider a facial constitutional challenge to be unsuccessful. Nev-
ertheless, he left the option open as a possibility.
2. Judge Norris's deadly force approach
In contrast to Judge Reinhardt's opinion, Judge Norris's concur-
rence and dissent considered a facial challenge to the city's police
dog policy to be very possible. 126 His concern was whether police
dogs should be labeled as instruments of deadly force; "the critical
question whether the use of LAPD dogs, as trained and deployed,
constitutes the use of deadly force cannot be decided as a matter of
law on the summary judgment record before us."'127 Judge Norris
considered this deadly force determination to be one of fact, 128 but
necessary to follow the law established in Tennessee v. Gardner.
1 29
To employ deadly force, be it a dog or gun, against a nondangerous,
nonresisting, or nonviolent offender would violate the precepts of
Gardner and the Constitution.1 30  Stated simply, to allow deadly
force dogs to root out hidden suspects would be tantamount to per-
mitting police officers to use their weapons to search and destroy.
3. Judge Trott's policy approach
Where the above plurality would allow a city to be held liable
for its unconstitutional police dog policy, Judge Trott's emotional
dissent would give the police carte blanche to use police dogs as they
see fit.131 Pointing to unsubstantiated proselytizing and hysteria in
lieu of precedent, Judge Trott declares police dogs constitutional be-
cause crime is out of control:
At this moment in history, criminals are succeeding in
doing what no foreign power has ever been able to
126. See id. at 1451-56 (Norris, J., concurring and dissenting).
127. Id. at 1453 (Norris, J., concurring and dissenting).
128. See id. at 1453 & n.6 (Norris, J., concurring and dissenting).
129. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
130. See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1453 (Norris, J., concurring and dissenting).
131. See id. at 1462-75 (Trott, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Trott
would agree with Judge Reinhardt's holding that a constitutional policy could
be used in an unconstitutional manner. However, he did not believe that Offi-
cer Bunch's use of his police dog in this circumstance was unreasonable. See
id. (Trott, J., concurring and dissenting).
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accomplish: they have invaded our streets, parks, beaches,
and backyards and made many feel like prisoners in their
own homes.... This appalling condition is a matter of
common knowledge and concern....
... [The] battle has been lost. As crime grows arithmeti-
cally, fear grows geometrically....
... Even a time-honored cultural tradition like flipping
the bird to some idiot driver is now in jeopardy. Instead of
just screaming back, he might blow your head off.'
32
This anecdotal justification, effective as a stirring call to arms, is
Judge Trott's way of saying police dogs are constitutional because
cops need them in their war against crime. 133 Judge Trott believes
that "[b]ecause of fear of lawsuits and liability, this decision may be
fatal to canine units, and by their demise, the ability of police to
combat criminals will be seriously hampered."'134 Although not
listed among his factors for finding police dogs constitutional, this
"crime is out of control" paranoia is clearly his greatest motivator
and rationale.
Judge Trott lists four factors why police dogs are reasonable
and, therefore, constitutional. 135 "First, a biting dog is not a bullet
from a firearm. A trained dog is much less dangerous than a shot-
gun.' 136 Second, police dogs protect police officers from hidden
criminals. 137 Third, warnings and opportunities for surrender are
given before any police dog is deployed. 138  Fourth, the cost of
searching for concealed suspects with police dogs is lower than
searching with police officers. 139 The sentiments behind these fac-
tors are not without merit, but all contain flaws in their facts,
132. Id. at 1462-63 (Trott, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Jonathan
Alter, Thiere's a War On at Home, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 27, 1993, at 42). The
right to "flip the bird" is irrelevant to the issues at hand in Chew.
133. See id. at 1463 (Trott, J., concurring and dissenting).
134. Id. (Trott, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 814 (1992)).
135. See id. at 1471-72 (Trott, J., concurring and dissenting).
136. Id. at 1471 (Trott, J., concurring and dissenting).
137. See id. (Trott, J., concurring and dissenting).
138. See id. (Trott, J., concurring and dissenting).
139. See id. at 1471-72 (Trott, J., concurring and dissenting).
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application, and logic. The problems with Judge Trott's analysis will
be addressed in Part II.C of this Article.
III. CRITIQUE OF THE LAW
The flaws of Chew v. Gates140 exhibited in its three different
opinions of police dog force are highly representative of the logic
used in other circuits. 141 The errors essentially categorize into three
schools: (1) municipal liability held secondary to individual officer's
liability; (2) erroneously labeling police dogs as nondeadly force;
and (3) incorrect policy justifications.
A. Municipal Liability Secondary to Officer Liability
The most insidious of the wrongs in police canine cases is the
practice of bifurcating the individual officer's trial from that of the
city. Judge Reinhardt's opinion gives lip service to the possibility
that the city police dog policy can be held unconstitutional of its own
accord. 142 However, he subjugates this possibility by instructing the
lower court to assess the individual officer's liability prior to and
separately from the city's liability. 143 This first-phase procedure can
end in only one of two ways-the individual officer is found liable or
is found not liable. However, neither conclusion ever results in the
city being held liable in its separate capacity.
The first conclusion is that the individual officer is acquitted of
all wrongdoing and the plaintiff is unable to prove a constitutional
injury against the officer. The existence of a constitutional injury is
obviously a threshold issue. Without a constitutional injury, even a
clearly unconstitutional policy will not establish a prima facie case.
"If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the
individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations
might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is
140. 27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994).
141. See, e.g., Kopfv. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374 (4th Cir. 1993); Gill v. Thomas,
83 F.3d 537 (1st Cir. 1992); Kopfv. Wing, 942 F.2d 265 (4th Cir. 1991); Kerr
v. City of West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1989); Robinette v.
Barnes, 854 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1988); Marley v. City of Allentown, 774 F.
Supp. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
142. See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1437.
143. See id. at 1436-39.
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quite beside the point." 144 This stance turns the two separate entities,
the individual officer and the city, into one whole.
For example, in Quintanilla v. City ofDowney, 45 the court held:
Prior to trial, the district court, over Quintanilla's opposi-
tion, bifurcated the claims against the three individual line
officers and the ... city, so that the first phase of the trial
would address the excessive force claim against the indi-
vidual officers, and the second phase the Monell claim
against the.., city.
146
In an attempt to combat this problem, the plaintiff "voluntarily
dismissed the three individual officers so that he could offer evidence
of the policy during the first phase."'147 Nevertheless, the trial court
defeated this sacrificial gesture. The court would not permit any evi-
dence regarding the city's police dog policy and excluded experts
prepared to testify on the matter.148 The appellate court upheld this
decision stating "counsel offered the evidence to show that the ...
city's policy of using police dogs, rather than the individual officers'
use of this particular police dog, was unconstitutional. As such, the
evidence was premature. The ... city's liability ... was not yet at
issue."
149
Unfortunately, the appellate court missed the point. The indi-
vidual officers were separate defendants. The plaintiff was not given
an opportunity to show that the city itself was liable. By denying an
opportunity to sue the city directly, there is no separate cause of ac-
tion against the city. There is only a derivative one.
As shown in Quintanilla, even where the plaintiff tries to clear
the extra hurdle bifurcation creates, and surrenders the most obvious
claim and source of his or her injury, the court will not permit it.
150
144. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam)
(emphasis removed).
145. 84 F.3d 353 (9th Cir. 1996).
146. Id. at 354.
147. Id. at 355.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 356.
150. Furthermore, without the companion suit against the officer, the suit
against the city may lack the necessary causation to meet the prima facie case.
It would be all too easy for the city to claim the police dog policy was not the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm and declare the plaintiff unable to meet
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Admittedly, if the plaintiff is unable to prove a constitutional injury
against the individual, the plaintiff will rarely be successful against
the city. Nevertheless, the plaintiff should be afforded the opportu-
nity to bring his or her claim against all of the defendants that could
possibly have caused the harm. This basic right is compromised by a
misconceived trial practice.
The second possible conclusion in the first phase of the bifur-
cated trial is that the individual officer is found liable and the court
acknowledges the existence of the plaintiffs constitutional injury.
As instructed in Chew and its progeny, if the individual officer is
found liable for the constitutional injury, the plaintiff has two
grounds on which to proceed against the city: in its independent ca-
pacity (a facial attack of the police dog policy) and via the individual
officer's wrongful conduct (a specific application attack).' 51 As ex-
plained previously, this threshold should not be necessary for the fa-
cial attack claim to proceed.
However, even with the injury judicially recognized, 152 the city
remains insulated from any liability because of the bifurcation proc-
ess. By proceeding against the individual officer first, the successful
plaintiff is fully compensated for his injuries before the city can be
found responsible. Despite Chew's promise of "free[dom] to pursue
... claims against [the city] for nominal damages,"' 5 3 the reality is
that once the plaintiff is fully compensated, all litigation will cease.
Police canine excessive force cases end because they are usually
handled on a contingency fee basis.' 54 No contingency fee lawyer
will proceed with an expensive and difficult facial challenge with
only nominal damages awaiting at the end. This is especially true
his or her burden of proof.
151. See Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998);
Chew, 27 F.3d at 1446.
152. This victory is, in and of itself, no small feat. Considering that plain-
tiffs in most police dog excessive force claims are criminal suspects, if not ac-
tually convicted of the crime they were seized for, they face considerable jury
prejudice in their claims. Juries are all too willing to use "law and order" no-
tions and other irrelevant rationales to disregard legitimate excessive force
claims. See infra Part III.C.1.
153. Chew, 27 F.3d at 1437.
154. See, e.g., Watkins v. City of Oakland, Cal., 145 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.
1998); Fikes v. Cleghom, 47 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1995); Chew v. Gates, 27
F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994).
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when both the lawyer and client have been fully compensated in their
claim in the first phase of the trial against the individual officer.
Furthermore, the city often will pay the officer's legal fees and
damages. 155 This action eliminates any need for the plaintiff and his
or her lawyer to continue the legal claim to find a "deep pocket."
The fact that the city bankrolls the individual officer in the first phase
of the trial makes the second phase of the bifurcation procedure su-
perfluous. This perpetuates police dog use without any broad or ex-
acting constitutional review. The bifurcation procedure essentially
makes a facial challenge to a police dog policy impossible.
Admittedly, it is possible for constitutional claims to be under-
taken pro bono or for nominal damages to correct a glaring constitu-
tional wrong. However, police dogs, except for their misuse against
African Americans in the 1960s, 156 are not a high priority for most
crusaders. Moreover, the likelihood to achieve success against the
individual officers in the first phase of the trial creates a catch-22
situation. Because the claims are so readily handled by contingency
fee lawyers, pro bono organizations will not spend their limited re-
sources to mount a facial attack on police dog policies. It is impor-
tant to remember that this is an unpopular issue. The general per-
ception, which is incorrect, is that police dogs do not pose a grave
danger. Police dog abuses are unlikely to capture the same emo-
tional support as, say, the death penalty. In fact, police dogs are so
popular that any organized sentiment against them might further al-
ienate already embattled and underfunded public interest groups.
155. See, e.g., Watkins v. City of Oakland, Cal., 145 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.
1998); Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1995); Chew v. Gates, 27
F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994); Samuel G. Chapman, Police Dogs Versus Crowds,
8 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMiN. 316, 321 (1980).
156. See Chapman, supra note 155, at 316 (noting that in 1963, Eugene
"Bull" Connor, the Birmingham Police Commissioner, released police dogs on
defenseless black protesters, remarking: "'I want them to see the dogs work.
Look at those niggers run."'). Not coincidentally, most canine units ban the
use of police dogs for the purposes of crowd control. See id. at 319-320. The
racial overture of police dog misuse continues with the LAPD using police
"dogs with abandon in poor and minority neighborhoods" and "injuring far
more black and Latino suspects than white suspects." Jim Newton, L.A. Finds
Mixed Results in Curbing Police Dog Bites, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 1, 1996, at Al.
The abuse of police dogs grew so pervasive that "some officers referred to
black suspects as 'dog biscuits."' Id.
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The bifurcation procedure renders the decision in Chew that the
city can be separately liable utterly meaningless. The result of these
misused trial practices is contrary to the letter and spirit of Chew.
B. Erroneously Labeling Police Dogs as Nondeadly Force
Judges Norris and Reinhardt declined to take up the issue of
whether police dogs constituted deadly force, explaining that the is-
sue should be analyzed further on remand. 157 Despite this encour-
agement, it is unlikely police dogs will be considered instruments of
deadly force. Only two cases have addressed the issue of police dogs
as instruments of deadly force, and both declined to find dogs as
such. Nevertheless, these decisions used flawed reasoning to reach
the wrong decision.
In Robinette v. Barnes,158 a wrongful death suit was brought on
behalf of a victim who was killed by a police dog. 159 While hiding
under a car, a burglary suspect was bitten on the neck by a police dog
and quickly bled to death. 60 This is the only reported case of a po-
lice dog killing a suspect while in the course of searching for the
suspect.
161
The court looked to the Model Penal Code 162 and removed two
independent factors to determine if a police dog constituted deadly
force. 163 The first factor was intent of the officer to inflict death or
serious bodily harm.164 The second factor was "the probability...
regardless of the officer's intent, that the law enforcement tool, when
employed to facilitate an arrest, creates a 'substantial risk of causing
death or serious bodily harm.""
65
157. See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1435.
158. 854 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1988).
159. Seeid. at911.
160. See id.
161. While this may be the only reported case of a police dog killing a sus-
pect, the case does not speak to a police dog's propensity to kill.
162. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(2) (Official Draft and Revised Com-
ments 1985).
163. See Robinette, 854 F.2d at 912.
164. See id.
165. Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(2) (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985)).
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The court determined that the officer released the police dog, the
officer did so without the intent to kill.166 This may be true, but that
only accounts for part of the Model Penal Code's definition of
deadly force. The court should also ask if the K-9 officer released
the dog with the intent to cause serious bodily harm. This question
must be answered in the affirmative. These dogs are trained to bite
their suspects.' 67 Every time K-9 officers deploy their dog, the offi-
cers intend to find the suspect, therefore, they intend the dog to bite
the suspect as vell. Furthermore, police dogs bite suspects forty per-
cent of the time,168 with up to 2000 pounds per square inch of pres-
sure169 that result in horrible puncture wounds and lacerations. 70 If
these type of injuries do not qualify as serious bodily harm, then
what will? Robinette's logic would call a gun nondeadly force if the
officer aims to wound a suspect in the leg instead of trying to kill
him.
As far as the probability factor, Robinette again failed to use the
complete Model Penal Code definition. Perhaps the death of the
suspect in that particular case "was an extreme aberration from the
outcome intended or expected,"' 7' but serious bodily harm is very
probable and expected. To say that it is unlikely for police dogs to
cause serious bodily harm is willful blindness by the court. The only
166. See id.
167. See Ken Wallentine, Find & Bite versus Find & Bark, at
http://www.policek9.comrTrainers-Digest/vallenl/bodywallenl.html (last
visited Sept. 26, 2000).
168. See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1454 n.8 (Norris, J., concurring and dissenting).
169. See Robert Ferrigno, Guard Dogs Muscle in on Hulking Jobs, CHI.
TRm., Aug. 6, 1985, at Cl. This figure is for a Rottweiler's bite. German
Shepherds and Doberman Pinschers bite with 1200 to 1500 pounds per square
inch of force. See id.
170. A small sample of typical police dog wounds include bites on the head,
neck, scrotum, torso, legs, and arms, which have resulted in surgery, lengthy
hospital stays, and even death. See generally Vera Cruz v. City of Escondido,
139 F.3d 659, 660-61 (9th Cir. 1997) (victim bitten on upper arm requiring
surgery and eight day hospitalization); Chew, 27 F.3d at 1436 (victim bitten on
side of torso and arm); Kopf v. Wing, 942 F.2d 265, 266-67 (4th Cir. 1991)
(victim bitten on arm, groin, thigh, and described as "frightfully mauled" and
in critical condition after arrest); Robinette, 854 F.2d at 911 (victim bitten on
neck causing death).
171. Robinette, 854 F.2d at 912.
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way police dogs will not fit the Model Penal Code definition of
deadly force is to use an incomplete definition.
The second case addressing the issue of police dogs as instru-
ments of deadly force was Vera Cruz v. City of Escondido. Although
the court rejected the use of the Model Penal Code definition of
deadly force, 172 it recognized that deadly force is difficult to define.
"[W]hat the phrase means is far from obvious. Given the frailty of
the human body, and the wide variety of conditions under which the
police must operate, almost any use of force is potentially deadly
,173
Considering this difficulty, the court defined deadly force as
"force which is reasonably likely to cause death.' ' 174 In other words,
the force must "pose more than a remote possibility of death."'
7
The Vera Cruz court did not establish police dogs as nondeadly
force, rather it simply held that the plaintiff failed to present evidence
that police dogs were reasonably likely to kill. 176 However, the court
did establish two factors to determine when force is reasonably likely
to kill: "(1) the degree of force and (2) the accuracy with which it is
directed at a vulnerable part of the human anatomy."'
177
No matter what the court's disposition of this specific case, the
Vera Cruz factors do not preclude police dogs from being labeled
deadly force in other contexts. As noted above, police dogs are a
significant source of force-able to inflict dismembering and lethal
bites. Yet, the incongruous Vera Cruz factors seemingly keep this
force from being labeled deadly because dogs are less controllable.
The converse should be true. The extreme force presented by dogs
should be more restricted because the handler has less control over
the dog than the officer has over his or her firearm. 178  The
172. See Vera Cruz, 139 F.3d at 662. The Ninth Circuit is in the minority.
Of the circuit courts that have addressed this issue, the Sixth, Eighth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits all use the Model Penal Code definition for deadly force.
See id. The Ninth Circuit felt that the police should not be limited by the
Model Penal Code standards, intended as criminal penalties. See id.
173. Id. at 661.
174. Id. at 663.
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 663 n.4.
178. The illogic of this proposition is exhibited by the absurd example used
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Vera Cruz logic would say that the more out of control the force, the
less likely it is to be deadly. That suggestion is ridiculous. What is
more deadly: a carefully driven car, or one that is out of control?
The only explanation for the gaps in logic demonstrated in
Robinette and Vera Cruz is the desire of the courts to protect the use
of police dogs. This partisanship is not only a dereliction of judicial
duty, but flies in the face of the police dog victim's rights. Never-
theless, the courts willfully turn a blind eye to this unconstitutional
use of deadly force.
C. Incorrect Policy Justifications
For the reasons discussed in Parts III.A and B, the continued use
of police dogs to search for and seize suspects is practically assured.
Perhaps in recognition of the inconsistencies and illogic used, the
courts vainly scramble for justifications to continue police dog use.
Although more hysteria than public policy, these justifications
should not carry the day over the detainee's civil rights. The senti-
ments exhibited in Judge Trott's opinion 179 are representative of the
policy rationales posited by courts to defend police dogs.
1. Crime is out of control
The hostility and near paranoia displayed by Judge Trott is more
suitable for a Dirty Harry movie s° than a judicial opinion. Crime
needs to be controlled, but the local evening news perspective of the
problem is neither accurate nor a reason to deny constitutional rights.
If it were, we would effectively have a police state.
Bluntly, crime is not out of control. In fact, crime rates are at a
thirty-year low. 181  These results do not necessitate the further
by the court. "[A] bullet shot in the air as a warning will not be deemed deadly
even if it accidentally hits a tree branch which falls and kills the suspect be-
low." Id. Simply stated, a firearm is deadly force, no matter how it is dis-
charged. This rationale allows the same officer firing his warning shot to hit
an innocent bystander and yet escape fault because this particular use of his
gun was not deadly. Judicially protecting patent deadly weapons would make
an already aggressive police force even more dangerous.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 132-40.
180. Dirty Harry, the take-the-law-into-his-own-hands prototypical detective
made famous by Clint Eastwood, endorsed a shoot 'em all philosophy to
"make his day." See SUDDEN IMPACT (Warner Brothers 1983).
181. The homicide rate in the United States has declined every year since
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militarizing of our police force. In light of the recent highly publi-
cized police brutality and corruption cases, 182 police forces should be
more sensitive to criticism. The entrenchment and intractability of
police to do away with dangerous techniques will only lead to further
public alienation.
The falsity of rampant crime is only part of the problem with
using high crime rates to justify police dogs. More disturbing is the
inappropriate jingoism and factionalism Judge Trott exhibits with his
justification. Judge Reinhardt phrased it best when he reminded
Judge Trott that "[j]udges are not correspondents for Newsweek. We
do not campaign for office .... Judges are supposed to be calm,
dispassionate, and committed to the principles of law." 183 It is all too
easy, especially with such an emotional and partisan topic as crime,
for the civil rights of detainees to be ignored beneath the majority's
fears. Courts, as a rule, are antimajoritarian:
When public concern rises dramatically over an issue like
crime, and politicians in the highest offices throughout the
land rush to abandon any pretense of a commitment to fun-
damental constitutional principles, it is essential that judges
keep their cool-that we, at least, remain determined to ful-
fill our role as the objective, steadfast guardians of individ-
ual liberty. First and foremost, it is our obligation to resist
all temptations to succumb to hysteria, all inclinations to
ignore our responsibilities and simply to join the pack. 1
84
If the courts fail to protect the least powerful members of our society,
no one will.
1994, while the current homicide rate, as of 1999, is the lowest since 1967.
See U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics: Additional Crime
Facts at a Glance, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/gvc.htm (last visited Aug.
27, 2000). In fact, robbery, assault, burglary, and theft rates have all fallen
since 1994. See id.
182. In addition to the celebrated Rodney King and New York plunger abuse
cases, police departments across the nation are still plagued by brutality
charges. The recent Rampart scandal has resulted in twenty officers being dis-
ciplined or fired. See Scott Glover & Matt Lait, LAPD Asks D.A. to Prosecute
Three Officers in Probe, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2000, at Al. If the police admit
they have problems and are willing to reexamine their procedures, why should
the courts drag their feet?
183. Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1450 (9th Cir. 1994).
184. Id.
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2. Dogs are not as deadly as guns
Another misleading policy justification for police dogs is their
portrayal as nondeadly instruments. It is beyond all doubt that guns
are more dangerous than police dogs, but, as noted above in Part
Ill.B, guns and police dogs are not mutually exclusive. Clearly, both
police dogs and guns can rank as deadly force. However, denying
the deadly force label is not the only manner in which police dog
supporters try to downplay police dogs' dangerousness.
It is a widely held misconception that police dogs are not as
dangerous as police batons, 185 yet, as explained above in Part lI.B,
police dogs are likely to cause serious bodily harm. Force rankings
aside, common sense would dictate that police dogs are at least as
much force as a baton, if not more so.1 86 Nevertheless, this inaccu-
racy persists because police departments consider police dogs to be
tools, not weapons, and do not include them in departmental analyses
of force.1 87 By sweeping the truth of canine force under the rug, po-
lice departments perpetuate the myth that police dogs are less dan-
gerous than they are in actuality.
3. Police dogs protect police officers
It is a truism that police officers' work is very dangerous and
every precaution should be taken to protect these brave people from
harm. However, this utilitarian use of police dogs does not have to
185. See Retired K-9 Handler Van Bogardus The Use of Police Dogs Con-
stitutes Deadly Force, He Says, at http://vwwv.policek9.comTrainersDigest/
bogardus/bodybogardus.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Bogar-
dus] (explaining that "dogs have been either level with or just below the use of
the baton"); United States Police Canine Association, at http'.//,vw.uspcak9.
com/caselaw/patrol(a).shtml (last visited Oct. 5, 2000) [hereinafter Force Con-
tinuum].
In fact, the requirement that police dog deployment be accompanied by
a prior warning is a tacit admission that police dogs carry more force than a
baton. See infra Part III.C.4.
186. All one need do is compare the striking force of a nightstick-the brute
force the officer can generate-with the substantial crushing power of a police
dog's jaws.
187. See Bogardus, supra note 185 (noting that Police Officers Standards
and Training have not included K-9s in with their use of force guidelines); see
also Force Continuum, supra note 185 ("Typically, canines are not classified
as 'weapons.').
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be abandoned to make police dog use safer and police departments
more accountable. We cannot ignore the constitutional rights of oth-
ers purely in the name of protecting police officers. If we did so, the
sentiments of Tennessee v. Garner,'8" Graham v. Connor,189 and all
other excessive force cases, would receive an absolute defense if the
force was executed in the name of "protecting police officers." An
important practical desire should not override all others. In fact, if
police officer safety is so important, detainee safety should be
equally as important. This is especially so when considering inno-
cent or inadvertent victims of police dogs.
4. Police dogs are accompanied by warnings before deployment
Generally, police canine policy mandates that a warning must be
given before the police dog is released. 190 This is a factor in reduc-
ing potential liability for police dogs by reducing accidental and
avoidable bites.191 This is a commendable policy, but, contrary to
what Judge Trott and his followers believe, it does not go far enough
to protect police dog victims.
Consider the circumstances in Chew where a suspect was within
a huge scrap yard. 192 Police dog warning announcements in that
context are a difficult proposition. A warning shouted before the
dogs enter the scrap yard would not be effective due to the size of the
property. Similar problems would exist with warnings announced
over helicopter loudspeakers, which have a limited range in which
the warnings can be understood.
The same problems exist when doing indoor searches. Warn-
ings announced from outside the building to be searched are ineffec-
tive when mistaken victims or those willing to surrender simply can-
not hear the warnings given outside. 193 Also, searches frequently
188. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
189. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
190. See, e.g., Chew, 27 F.3d at 1436 (the police dog handler called out
warning before deploying dog); Kopf v. Wing, 942 F.2d 265, 268 (4th Cir.
1991) (experts explaining that warnings are required to allow suspect chance to
surrender).
191. For example, a suspect that does not receive a warning that he or she
would have otherwise have heeded, would be unnecessarily bitten.
192. See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1436.
193. See, e.g., Kopfv. Wing, 942 F.2d 265, 266 (4th Cir. 1991) (the suspect
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occur at night and people who are asleep may not hear the warnings.
Regardless of Judge Trott's feelings that these warnings are suffi-
cient protection against accidental bites, avoidable bites continue to
occur. 
1 9 4
5. Police dogs search more cheaply than police officers
Training police dogs is not a cheap process, especially consid-
ering the weekly reinforcement training they require.1 95 It is not a
given that K-9 units are cheaper to use than regular police officer
searches. Consider the following Rialto Police Department state-
ment: "[Maintaining police dogs is an expensive task. . . . 'If we
didn't have Friends of Rialto Police K-9s, we wouldn't have a pro-
gram.... They have paid for every dog we ever had."" 196 Despite
expensive purchase, training, and equipment costs, these are not the
only expenses to consider with police dogs.
First, K-9 units are special tactical units that do not normally
patrol a designated area as would other beat cops.19 K-9 units are
special response units that are deployed primarily at the request of
regular patrol officers.' 98 K-9 units do not replace regular patrols,
but supplement them and, therefore, are an added cost.
did not hear the warning).
194. See, e.g., David Beers, A Biting Controversy, L.A. TMES, Feb. 9, 1992,
(Magazine), at 22 (noting that the victim was bitten on the testicle while read-
ing a book in the park because "the dog just got too far out in front [of the han-
dler]"); Tina Dirmann, Police Dog Sinks Teeth into Arm of Rialto Bystander
During Chase, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside), Nov. 19, 1997, at B3; Henry K.
Lee, Richmond Police Dog Fired for Attack, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 18, 1997, at
A15 (noting that a three-year-old boy and his aunt were attacked by police dog
that escaped from his handler).
195. Purchase costs of police dogs are between $9000 and S12,000, exclud-
ing ongoing training expenses. Police K-9 vehicles cost upwards of S30,000.
See Scott Hadly, Bark for Backup Police Canines Show Their 'Ruff" and Gen-
tle Sides as They Do the Duty of Protecting and Serving, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11,
1996, atB1.
196. Charlene S. Engeron, Canine Unit Thrives with Friends' Aid, PRESS-
ENTERPRISE (Riverside), Aug. 19, 1999, at B2 (quoting K-9 officer Jim Gib-
bons).
197. See U.S. POLICE CANINE ASSOC., A Manual for Back-up Officers & Su-
pervisors, at http://vww.uspcak9.com/atining/k9manual.shtml (last visited
Oct. 11, 2000).
198. See, e.g., Chew, 27 F.3d at 1436.
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Second, in the situation that existed in Chew, a "massive de-
ployment of police officers" was used despite the presence of K-9
units. 199 Multiple patrol units and police helicopters were used to
find the suspect.20 0 K-9 units were just part of the routine police de-
ployment that procedures require in scenarios of that nature.
2 0 1
Third, K-9 units costs should not be compared to regular patrol
officers, but to other specialty units-such as SWAT teams, bomb
squads, or CRASH units-which exist because of skills uniquely
suited to particular situations. It is misleading to say that K-9 units,
like other specialized police forces, were developed because they
were cheaper than regular patrol officers. In fact, they exist despite
their added costs.
Finally, K-9 units would not be so cheap if not for the artificial
liability protection they receive from courts. If police dog victims
were actually given their constitutional right to find cities liable for
their police dog policies, the added costs of litigation and payouts
would make police dogs a great deal more expensive than they are
today. It is highly doubtful that Judge Trott took police dogs' proper
potential for liability into account when figuring his cost analysis.
6. Police dog reputations
"Fearsome toothed avengers or soft cuddly puppies-the image
of police canines seems to vary depending on which side of the law
you stand. 2 0 2 When courting the law-and-order crowd, police dogs
are highly valued as a deterrent. "Their mere presence on the street,
even the knowledge that they may be lurking near, exerts a powerful
restraint upon lawbreakers."20 3 'They have a tremendous psycho-
logical effect on people,"' a curious result for a so-called low-force
instrument.
20 4
However, "[police] dogs are used for a tremendous amount of
public relations work, at local schools and community events."
20 5
199. Id. at 1471.
200. See id. at 1436.
201. See id. at 1444-45.
202. Hadly, supra note 195, at B1.
203. Robert L. O'block et al., The Benefits of Canine Squads, 7 J. POLICE
Sc. & ADMIN. 155, 157 (1979).
204. Hadly, supra note 195, at B1.
205. Id.
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This is done to combat their otherwise fierce reputation, as one
commentator noted, "'we're still trying to overcome the image of
these dogs being turned loose on civil rights demonstrators in the
1960s' ..... [and the] flood of excessive-force claims." 206 It appears
to be working, with community groups raising money for police de-
partments to purchase and train more dogs. 20 7 This aggressive mar-
keting campaign has swayed the public and judiciary alike. Foster-
ing this warm and fuzzy image inhibits juries and the public at large
from taking an objective look at police dog harms. The proof is in
the pudding in the fact that there are many groups raising money for
police dogs, but none raising money for police dog victims.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The motive for the above listed illogic and blindness by the
courts is simple-fear. The fear of losing an effective police tool;
fear of appearing soft on crime; fear of change. However, to use a
phrase, "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.' 20 8 The judicial
overreaction is not only legally and morally dishonest, but unneces-
sary. In fact, all of these problematic issues can be tweaked in such a
way as to eliminate the negatives and still retain the full effectiveness
of police dogs.
A. Individual Officer Liability Sioud be Secondary to
Municipal Liability
The most obvious solution to finding cities liable for their police
dog policies is to eliminate the bifurcation procedure used by trial
courts. This would allow the plaintiff to proceed directly against the
city witaout regard to the individual officer's fault.
In other words, a facial attack on the city police dog policy
would be possible after a victim was bitten. For example, a K-9
206. Id. (quoting Ventura Police Department Lt. Dave Inglis).
207. See id. ("In Simi Valley, a group of residents set up a Friends of the K-9
group that has raised money to pay for the newest dog."); Engeron, supra note
196, at B2 (The Friends of Rialto Police K-9s raised nearly $6000 for police
canine program.). Similar groups have been formed in Santa Paula, Thousand
Oaks, and Ventura. See id.
208. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at his First Presidential Inau-
guration (Mar. 4, 1933).
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officer releases his or her charge and the detainee is bitten. Whether
or not this was found to be reasonable within the context of the po-
lice dog policy, the victim would be permitted to challenge the policy
itself. Similar to a facial attack on state abortion regulations,20 9 the
victim could challenge the use of police dogs in their specific situa-
tion and how the general police dog policy effects other individuals.
This approach would expand the admissible evidence and allow the
plaintiff to go beyond the particulars of the case and make the city
accountable for the fundamental flaws within its police dog policy.
Eliminating the bifurcation procedure would be a good start, but
it seems unlikely to occur. Although not as comprehensive a solu-
tion, instituting punitive damages or attorney's fees for victorious
section 1983 actions would also be helpful. This would eliminate the
vexing problem where the plaintiff is fully compensated in his or her
case against the individual officer, but thereafter is unable to pursue a
claim against the city because the contingency fee lawyer will not
continue for only nominal damages.210 If punitive damages or attor-
ney's fees were a possibility, then the city police dog policy would
likely receive a vigorous challenge in court. Unfortunately, the eco-
nomics of law require a carrot to satisfy the spirit of the law.
Although punitive damages may seem more appropriate in a
personal injury context like police dog bite victims, statutorily fixed
attorney's fees are a better solution. Attorney's fees are more practi-
cal since juries will be reluctant to return a large award when the
plaintiff has already been compensated for his or her injuries. A sec-
ond phase against the city will already result in biasing the jury-
thinking that the plaintiff has already gotten what he or she deserves
and is simply looking for more. Statutory attorney's fees will re-
move the lawyer's compensation from the juror's hands. Therefore,
the jury will only decide the nominal damage issue and hopefully re-
alize that more is at stake than the plaintiffs desire to "cash in" on
his or her injuries.
209. See generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (expanding the notion of facial attacks on abortion regula-
tions).
210. See supra Part III.A.
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B. Police Dogs Should be Labeled as Deadly Force
Considering the recent Vera Cruz v. City of Escondido2 t 1 deci-
sion and the general tenor of the courts,212 police dogs will likely re-
main classified as nondeadly force for the foreseeable future. This
error in jurisprudence is compounded by the fact that police dogs can
be trained to eliminate their lethal tendencies and still retain all of
their effectiveness.
There are currently two theories of police dog use: "find and
bite" (also known as "bite and hold") and "find and bark" (also
known as "circle and bark"). 213 Unfortunately, neither of these phi-
losophies goes far enough to mitigate the dangers of police dogs so
as to take them out of the realm of deadly force.
Find and bite is as simple as it sounds. A police dog is sent into
the area to be searched and, upon finding the suspect, bites him or
her.214 The dogs are trained to continue biting until the K-9 handler
orders the dog to release.215 This kind of training is hailed by some
police groups as more effective because it disables the suspect more
quickly and directly.216 However, the qualities that make it a more
"effective" training technique are also what make it more deadly.
The Los Angeles Police Department was a huge proponent of this
technique, but the fifteen dog handlers sent more detainees to "the
hospital each year than the rest of the 8,450- member LAPD com-
bined., 217 The find and bite technique was used until a $3.6 million
legal settlement forced the LAPD to change their practices. 218 The
LAPD's change of heart is hardly unanimous. Even within the same
county, the Sheriffs Department continues to use the find and bite
policy.
219
211. 139 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
212. See supra Part I.B.
213. See Savage, supra note 5, at Al; Wallentine, supra note 167.
214. See Savage, supra note 5, at Al; Wallentine, supra note 167.
215. See Savage, supra note 5, at Al; Wallentine, supra note 167.
216. See R.S. Eden, Handler Control vs Bark and Hold Apprehension
Techniques, at http://vww.policek9.conVTrminersDigestibitevsbk/body_
bitevsbk.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2000); Wallentine, supra note 167.
217. Savage, supra note 5, at Al.
218. See id.
219. See Newton, supra note 156, at Al.
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The find and bark technique is theoretically less violent. The
police dog searches out the suspect, barks when the suspect is found,
and will only bite when attacked or threatened.22 ° This technique has
reduced the number of bites from the more ruthless find and bite
method.221 This progress is excellent and shows the effectiveness of
retraining police dogs. However, it does not go far enough, espe-
cially when analyzing the flaws of find and bark training and the
ability to lower police dog bites to zero.
The official policy is that find and bark police dogs will only
bite if threatened or attacked. However, the words threatened or at-
tacked have a very broad meaning. The dog may well think it is be-
ing "attacked" if the suspect simply moves. In fact, the dogs are
"'trained to bite at movement, and they will bite if the suspect
moves."' 222 The average person's most probable reaction to a snarl-
ing dog is to move. This natural reaction may trigger bites that could
be avoided.
22For example, consider the case of Kopfv. Wing.223 There, a find
and bark dog bit a suspect who wished to surrender and a struggle
ensued in which the suspect was "frightfully mauled,, 224 and re-
quired thirty-seven days in the hospital to treat bites to the upper lip,
chest, knee, leg, and scrotum.2 25 Needless to say, find and bark dogs
carry the same deadly force potential as find and bite dogs.
The only way to turn dogs from deadly force into nondeadly
force is to eliminate the dog's bite. An innovative solution is equip-
ping police dogs with a muzzle-like stun gun device. "'The dog's
going in for a bite, but he can't bite"' and the suspect is zapped by
the "stun gun [which] have long been considered safe., 226 Police
220. See Wallentine, supra note 167.
221. See Savage, supra note 5, at Al (reducing LAPD bites from more than
300 a year to less than 30).
222. Newton, supra note 156, at Al (quoting L.A. Sheriffs Department dog
handler, Sgt. William Thompson).
223. 942 F.2d 265 (4th Cir. 1991).
224. Id. at 267.
225. See Debbie M. Price, P.G. Officer in Brutality Case was Drunk Driv-
ers'Nemesis, WASH. POST, July 16, 1989, at D1.
226. Jeff Kramer, No Bark, Lots of Arc, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 13,
1997, at Al (quoting co-inventor Harvey S. Allen).
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departments find the product promising, but demand more testing be-
fore it is more widely instituted.2 "
Perhaps police dogs should not seize suspects at all. This seems
incongruous, but it is the dog's nose that makes it so useful as a
tracker of hidden suspects. "A dog's sense of smell is 100,000 times
stronger than that of man's."228 David Reaver, the lead trainer of the
Adlerhorst Police Dog Training School, admits that "[w]e use police
dogs for their sense of smell-to find people and things."
' 29
If the dog's nose is the primary rationale for using police dogs to
search for hidden suspects, then it should be the primary use of po-
lice dogs as well. If police dogs only track and "alert" to hidden sus-
pects without engaging the suspect at all, then we have a perfect
situation. The police get the full use of the dog's uncanny nose to
find its quarry, and the suspect is only faced with the amount of force
that is appropriate for the situation.
Using the same rationale, a change in the type of dog used
would also improve matters. Instead of Rottveilers or German
Shepherds, a more passive breed with equally effective noses should
be used. Perhaps Retrievers or Bloodhounds, who "have the Cadillac
of noses in the dog world,"230 would be better suited. Bloodhounds
have another benefit in that .'[t]hey don't bite... only drivel."'' 1
By changing not only how police dogs are used, but the breed of dog
used, the result would be the elimination of all concerns of police
dog deadly force.
V. CONCLUSION
Dogs used for enforcement purposes have a very long pedigree.
Police dogs have their roots in ancient Egypt, Greece, and Persia
where the "dogs of war" were used in military campaigns to attack
war horses.232 They were first used in a police capacity to control
227. See id.
228. O'block et al., supra note 203, at 157.
229. Ferrigno, supra note 169, at Cl. The name of Reaver's training
school-Adlerhorst-is German for "eagle's nest," the same name of Adolf
Hitler's retreat. See Newton, supra note 156, at Al.
230. Louise Roug, Crine-Sniffers are on the Scent, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21,
1999, at B 1.
231. Id. (quoting Orange County Sheriff Mike Corona).
232. See Wallentine, supra note 167.
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gangs in Paris and found their way to New York in 1907.233 In all of
this time, from armor wearing dogs of the middle ages to the border
patrols of East Germany up through the modem police K-9s of today,
the manner in which the dogs are used has remained exactly the
same. While police dogs must be modernized, they do not have to be
abolished.
"'This is never a problem with the dogs .... It's a cop prob-
lem.' ' 234 The dogs are simply a product of training. They do not
"go over the line" or have malicious intent, they simply respond to
what they are taught. They can be retrained to make them safer and
to fall within constitutionally acceptable limits. Eliminating the sei-
zure role of their duties will end police dog abuses and lawsuits. If
the nose is the true purpose for using the dog, then there should be no
problem eradicating dogs as implements of restraint. However,
when police departments resist this change, their true intentions for
the dogs are revealed. Unfortunately, the courts permit the police to
remain intractable.
The courts' reasons for protecting police dogs as enforcement
tools are the same as the police departments': fear of change and
public opinion. This is an improper role for the courts. They should
protect the least powerful members of our society, not lay down with
police dogs. If the courts abandon their duties and take sides with
the executive branch, then our whole basis of government fails.
The bifurcation procedure used by courts to deny proper review
of police dog policies is a most cryptic and shameful method. Even
when the plaintiffs injury is recognized, and the police dog use is
found improper, courts have established procedure to prevent any fa-
cial attacks. By removing the possibility of damages for a lawsuit
directly against the police dog plan, there can be no exacting review.
The question will always be focused on the specific circumstances of
the police dog assault and never on the police dog's greater role.
Even when a wrong is established, nothing will be done.
This closer scrutiny would be possible if police dogs were con-
sidered deadly force, but here too the courts fail to do what is
233. See id.
234. Newton, supra note 156, at Al (quoting plaintiffs lawyer Donald W.
Cook).
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expected of them. Incomplete and self-serving narrow definitions
are used to calculate whether police dogs constitute deadly force.
The past military history of dogs and the damage they inflict is not
enough for the courts to be moved. Perhaps a higher death toll is
what they desire.
A closing comparison may be useful to illustrate the problems
with the courts' and police departments' behavior. It used to be
common place for arrested suspects to be denied counsel and coerced
into confessions. The Supreme Court took aims to correct this prob-
lem with Miranda v. Arizona.235 The case ignited fierce resistance
by police groups and even presidents, but nevertheless instituted the
change in the long-standing traditional police practice.2 6  The
Miranda decision has recently come under fire, but, surprisingly, po-
lice groups are now in favor of the judicially imposed warnings. 
37
Now the "new procedure" is the established practice. Police depart-
ments may not like change, but they are more than capable of im-
plementing it. Perhaps, with the courage of the courts, the same
story can be written for police dogs.
Mark Weintraub*
235. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
236. See GREAT AMERICAN TRIALS 505-08 (Edward W. Knappman ed.,
1994).
237. See Michael Hedges, Police Say Miranda Here to Stay, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Apr. 20, 2000, at A31.
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